The determinants of credit default swap spreads in emerging market economies by Matakane, Lwazi
THE DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP SPREADS IN 
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES
LWAZI MATAKANE
Student Number: 08m1672
Thesis to be submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of
MASTER OF COMMERCE (FINANCIAL MARKETS)
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 
RHODES UNIVERSITY, GRAHAMSTOWN
Supervisor: Mr D. Fryer
Estimated submission date: December 15 2016
ABSTRACT
Emerging markets have become a destination for international portfolio flows as a 
result of global financial integration. This has allowed exogenous factors like 
sentiment and developed country monetary policy to affect developing countries 
capital markets and macroeconomic fundamentals. This study analyses the impact 
of investor sentiment alongside US monetary policy, country specific risks, 
inflation and domestic stock returns on the BRICS credit default spreads. To 
investigate this relationship, the study uses panel data and a fixed effects model.
The results of the panel regressions suggest that all variables had an impact on the 
variation of BRICS credit default spreads however the crisis may have distorted 
the relationship among the variables. Sovereign ratings had an inverse relationship 
depicting a rise in ratings decreasing the credit default premium. This was in line 
with a priori expectations. Domestic company earnings also had an inverse 
relationship with BRCIS credit default premia, the magnitude of which is 
dependent on the value of the index. This is to say the higher the index, the more 
significant the effect on the BRICS default premium. US monetary policy was 
significant and in line with expectations of a linear relationship between emerging 
market credit default spreads when controlling for the crisis. In the crisis period 
however, results depicted an inverse relationship going against a priori 
expectations. The inflation variable was found to have a greater impact on CDS 
spreads during the crisis period, while the VIX index had a linear relationship with 
the default premia albeit the impact was not highly significant. The study 
concludes that the financial crisis was an important event that affected the 
relationship of these variables with BRICS country default spreads and had read 
through to market participant’s behaviour at the time.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 CONTEXT
For most of the twentieth century hegemony over global governance and influence 
has been largely maintained by the developed western nations. Developing 
countries had very limited access to platforms that would allow them to influence 
matters of global significance. However emerging market economies have been in 
the spotlight as a result of staggering growth prospects and the immediate 
opportunities for investment. Consequently emerging market countries have been 
advocating for fairer and more equal opportunities on platforms such as the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). This is as a result of growing discontent with the 
global financial and economic systems that are believed to be largely beneficial to 
the West. This resulted in the institutional consolidation of the five leading 
emerging market countries namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(BRICS).
The BRICS nations are said to account for 40 percent of the global population 
(Sergunin, 2015). Moreover BRICS share of world trade has increased 
significantly from a mere 3.6 percent in 1990 to over 15 percent of global trade by 
2010 (Purugganan, 2014). BRICS countries also share similar problems such as 
the need to modernize, stabilise currencies and achieve economic growth that will 
reduce the high number of people living in poverty (Sergunin, 2015). According to 
the orthodox account of modernisation and development, in order for emerging 
market countries to achieve high growth and eradicate poverty, emerging market 
economies needed to undergo capital account liberalisation (Rodrik and 
Subramanian, 2008). This would allow for foreign inward investment in the form 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) as developing nations are deemed to be 
constrained by savings.
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Reforms that target capital account liberalization by emerging market countries 
were to be instituted with the assistance of international monetary institutions. 
Accordingly, the liberalization of developing country financial markets has been 
followed by large capital inflows from global institutional investors (Schmuckler, 
2003). However, the capital flows have been argued to be largely short term 
flows. These hot money flows have added to emerging market volatility 
amplifying business cycle fluctuations (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008).
Global financial integration has not only provided an abundance of capital willing 
to invest in emerging markets but has increased vulnerability for the BRICS 
countries to events taking place in international capital markets. Therefore BRICS 
members with limited capacity to intervene in their domestic capital markets, in 
times of financial turmoil experience shocks that destabilise domestic 
macroeconomic conditions. Such events take place through trade and financial 
linkages with the rest of the world. This has the ability to create volatility and 
turbulence in the member country’s domestic capital markets. According to 
Moody’s (2015) prolonged periods of emerging market risk aversion cause 
financial market turbulence for EM countries, especially those with high current 
account deficits and significant external financing needs. Moody’s (2015) further 
states that the long awaited US monetary tightening cycle is expected to raise 
capital costs and deplete the availability of funding for EM countries, thereby 
creating more turbulence for sovereign yields and credit risk for emerging nations. 
According to Baek et al (2005) market assessed country risk is not only 
determined by economic fundamentals but also non country specific factors such 
as the markets attitude towards risk.
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) Financial Stability Report (2015) 
concurs, providing evidence that global sovereign credit default swap spreads for 
the regions of Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Americas increased 
around the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting of September 
2015.
Furthermore, emerging countries like South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, Russia and 
Venezuela saw the sharpest volatility in five year credit default swap spreads as a 
result of uncertainty caused by the US interest rate normalization decision (SARB,
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2015a; SARB, 2015b). Apart from the effects of US monetary policy there are 
other factors that affect emerging market countries creditworthiness. Idiosyncratic 
factors such as debt to GDP, external debt burden, a country’s fiscal position, the 
composition of the balance of payments and economic growth affects developing 
nation’s credit risk profile. Sovereign credit ratings, provided by credit rating 
agencies, encapsulate these factors in their rating determination (Elkhoury, 2009).
Credit rating agencies (CRA) are vehicles used by financial markets to provide an 
indication of the financial instrument issuers’ ability to honour their obligations. 
These quasi-regulatory institutions have established a niche in the global financial 
architecture as specialised intermediaries of information. Credit rating agencies 
make use of both public and non-public information and by applying various 
techniques both quantitative and qualitative, establish the risk of default by an 
issuer (Maas, 2011). The ratings given by these institutions are therefore used to 
determine capital charges on debt obligation (Elkhoury, 2009). These institutions 
have been accused of causing procyclicality in emerging markets, increasing 
emerging market volatility.
Global investor sentiment equally plays an integral role in explaining the variation 
in emerging market debt spreads and thereby the change in risk profiles of 
emerging countries (Remolona, Scatigna and Wu, 2007). Yafeh (2002) asserts 
that emerging market sovereign bond yields move in tandem and are driven by 
global events rather than country fundamentals.
With the current global economic environment being characterised by low interest 
rates, high liquidity as a result of quantitative easing and a savings glut, the 
withdrawal of such liquidity is likely to have a significant impact on the BRICS 
countries ability to finance and subsequently service debt.
With all the aforementioned factors that may have a significant impact on the 
BRICS financial and economic stability, a study that investigates the relationship 
of these factors with BRICS country credit risk was warranted. As all material 
developments in markets affect investor sentiment, a priori expectations are that 
investor sentiment is a significant variable that can explain some of the variance 
in emerging market credit risk albeit markets will discriminate between countries. 
US monetary policy events, especially surprises in policy, should also be
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significant as the policy affects global liquidity and feeds into risk sentiment 
towards emerging markets. Changes in idiosyncratic variables encapsulated in 
credit ratings should be significant due to mandates that dictate the type and 
quality of financial securities into which fund management institutions can invest 
their funds. Sudden changes in the domestic environment may not be immediately 
captured by credit ratings. However the effects of the changes will feed into 
sentiment towards the particular country and markets will react accordingly. Long 
term structural changes will be reflected in credit ratings. Moreover one would 
expect a circular relationship between company earnings and the economic 
environment, with the former being a leading indicator of economic conditions.
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The aim of this research paper is to examine the relationship between the BRICS 
countries credit default swap spreads and distortions in the global environment, 
specific country factors as shown by country sovereign credit ratings, changes or 
biases in global investor sentiment and domestic company earnings. The sub­
goals therefore are:
• To determine the nature of the relationship of these factors with the 
BRICS countries credit default swap spreads.
• Determine the significance of the impact of these variables in the 
variation of the BRICS countries default premia.
1.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Credit default swap spreads provide a more accurate adjustment to a country’s 
risk premium as perceived by market participants. The methodology that will be 
employed in this paper closely resembles that of Alper (2006).
Alper uses balanced panel data and a fixed effects model to test for the influence 
of surprises in US monetary policy on emerging market bond spreads. He 
conducts his investigation using 17 emerging market bond spreads from the 
emerging market bond index (EMBI+). To control for country level fundamentals 
and market sentiment respectively, Alper (2006) uses credit ratings and the S&P 
500 volatility index (VIX) as proxies. The investigation conducted in this
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dissertation is restricted to four of the five BRICS countries. There appears to be 
insufficient data on Indian credit default swap spreads to include the member 
country. This article will examine the nature of the relationship between global 
sentiment as represented by the VIX, sovereign credit rating, the US Federal funds 
rate, domestic company returns, inflation and BRICS countries default spreads. 
Sovereign credit rating and the US Federal funds rate will be used to control for 
country specific factors and US monetary policy effects respectively, while 
company earnings will be used to control for domestic economic activity. 
Bloomberg as a data repository is used to obtain month end values for 5 year 
credit default swaps for the BRICS countries for the period 2003 -  2015. BRICS 
historical securities exchange index data was also obtained from Bloomberg. Data 
on the ratings of the BRICS countries was taken from Moody’s website. The 
volatility index (VIX) data and inflation data was obtained from Bloomberg and 
the US Federal funds rate was obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream.
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
The organisation of the study is as follows: Chapter two provides a literature 
review of the theory underpinning the New Financial Architecture. Traditional 
finance theory such as rational expectations theory and EMH are also discussed. 
Chapter three provides a review of behavioural finance, US monetary policy and 
the current excess liquidity environment. Chapter four provides an overview of 
data and the methodology used in this study. Chapter five reports on the empirical 
findings and lastly Chapter six provides a summary and areas of further research.
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CHAPTER 2
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AND MARKET EFFICIENCY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a review of the theoretical underpinnings of the New 
Financial Architecture (NFA) and credit rating agencies. The chapter also 
provides empirical literature on credit rating agencies and theories concerning 
market efficiency. The orthodox account asserts that markets for the most part are 
efficient with the ability to self-equilibrate. This conjecture follows mostly from 
the foundations of classical economics and its assumptions on market equilibrium.
However even the orthodox literature acknowledges some market failures due to 
asymmetries largely as a result of informational inefficiency. Credit rating 
agencies were established with the view of ameliorating problems associated with 
informational efficiency. However rating agencies have been accused of implicitly 
exacerbating the problem. Thus economists have differed in accepting the 
orthodox narrative, as an adequate economic paradigm to explain real world 
phenomena.
This chapter will therefore provide a review of theories on investor expectation 
and market efficiency, alongside a review of regulatory systems established for 
market stability. The chapter will provide an assessment on their impact on 
emerging markets. The chapter is divided as follows Section 2.2 discusses the 
theoretical underpinnings of the New Financial Architecture (NFA) and credit 
rating agencies. Section 2.3 will provide a review of empirical literature on credit 
rating agencies and the efficient market hypothesis and lastly Section 2.4 will 
conclude.
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.2.1 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING OF THE NEW FINANCIAL 
ARCHITECTURE
The NFA is based on the idea of market efficiency. Underpinning the idea of 
efficient markets are the rational expectations theory (REH) and the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). There have been a number of discussions on the 
behaviour of market participants. Most notably, academics have been concerned 
with the use of information by market agents and the subsequent effect on asset 
pricing. This concern has been used to explain in many instances how 
expectations are formed and how the use of information facilitates market 
equilibria. There are three approaches to expectations that were formulated by 
economists. Expectation are said to be exogenous, adaptive and rational.
Firstly exogenous expectation is the assertion that expectations are formed by 
events outside the particular economic system (Howells and Bain, 2008). This is 
when significant market moving events take place outside domestic capital 
markets which affects the performance of the domestic market. The result of 
these external events is seen on the impact that these events have, on the views of 
domestic economic participants for the foreseeable future of local assets. The 
second approach states that expectations are adaptive or backward looking. In 
this instance people extrapolate from past trends and make inferences for future 
price determinations (Lovell, 1986; Howells and Bain, 2008). Lastly expectations 
are deemed to be formed by market agents in order to construct a model of the 
economy. These expectations are called rational expectations. The rational 
expectations hypothesis (REH) can be formally defined as the act by market 
agents, in their self-interest, of making a decision with the use of all available 
information (Howells and Bain, 2008: 285).
Literature on rational expectations is largely accredited to Muth (1961) and its 
later application in macroeconomics to Lucas et al (1973). Muth (1961) observed 
two conclusions from studies concerning expectations namely, the average of the 
expectations for an industry are more accurate than models and, reported 
expectations underestimate the extent of changes that actually take place. The 
argument provided for is that industry participant expectations tend to be more
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accurate than forecasted models by market commentators. Moreover, reported 
expectations tend to be more conservative that actual outcomes. Muth attributes 
this to the rigidity of economic models that do not allow for changes in the 
behaviour of economic actors as time and the conditions of the underlying 
economic environment change.
Syll (2012) views the REH as only applicable to stable and stationary processes 
as opposed to real world events. He views rational expectations as an extension 
of neoclassical macroeconomic theory and the cornerstone of the efficient market 
hypothesis (Syll, 2012: 2). The expectations theory, he states differs from the 
view held by Keynes of a future that is largely uncertain and unknowable (Syll, 
2012:3). Syll (2012) further rejects claims that on average people or agents share 
similar expectations but argues that expectations differ as do information sets 
hence Keynes’ advocacy for macroeconomic coordination. Pech and Milan 
(2009) state that Keynes’ argued that in situations of uncertainty economic 
participants use conventions or heuristics to guide their actions, supported by a 
weighting or degree of confidence in those conventions. This argument seems to 
precede behavioural finance and its assertions.
Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) investigate the assumptions of the REH by 
analysing the informational content of prices in financial markets. They contend 
with the assumption that the rational expectations equilibrium price reveals all 
information to all the traders. Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) describe the 
rational competitive expectations equilibrium as the point where the market 
clears and the beliefs of traders’ about the distribution of all observable variables 
is fulfilled (Diamond and Veracchia, 1981: 6). They assert traders learn nothing 
from prices. Thus, because traders observe their own information and the price, 
the equilibrium price cannot contain all available information.
However they find that in the presence of noise within markets, there appears to 
be information diversity rather than asymmetry. Therefore market participants 
are motivated to act on their private information, contributing to market 
informational efficiency. The result is prices being partially revealing as noise 
allows for the aggregation of information and through noise traders or technical 
analysts, assist in the price discovery mechanism.
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Bryant (1983), in accordance with Syll (2012), agrees that rational expectations 
go against Keynes assumption of the behaviour of economic agents. Like Syll 
(2012) he states that there is nothing rational about the REH as Keynes proposed 
that economic agents assign weights to the probabilities of certain events taking 
place as a result of their beliefs. Blanchard and Watson (1982) appear to agree 
with the assertions put forth by Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) arguing that the 
rationality of both behaviour and expectations of economic agents do not imply 
that the price of an asset resembles its fundamental value (Blanchard and Watson, 
1982: 3).
However they go on to say there can be rational deviations from an assets 
fundamental value. This is to say that if asset prices do not necessarily reflect 
past and current information, it is not evidence of irrationality in markets. Chari 
and Jaganathan (1987) also add to the notion of rational deviations by 
investigating bank runs. They assert that when economic agents observe large 
queues at banks, even without adverse information, would be rational to infer a 
failure and therefore precipitate a bank run (Chari and Jaganathan, 1987: 14).
With the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) the rational expectations hypothesis 
received criticism on its theoretical soundness and its inability to predict the 
financial collapse. According to Dwyer et al (1993) the popular proposition of 
economic agents that gather and use information efficiently appeared to be 
inconsistent with the evidence collected prior to the global financial crisis. 
Levine (2012) a proponent of rational expectations argues the need for an 
uncertainty principle in economics like other scientific disciplines, as there are 
limits to the ability of economists to simultaneously be aware of facts. He argues 
the rational expectations hypothesis to not be a principle of perfect foresight.
Levine therefore describes rational expectations as a belief in forecasts that is 
self-fulfilling (Levine, 2012: 1). He however acquiesces to the limits of such a 
theory. Levine’s proposal had been acknowledged by Keynes many years ago.
Having discussed the behaviour of economic agents as proposed by the rational 
expectations hypothesis a mixed picture is provided. Scholars appear to be 
divided on the theoretical soundness of the rational expectations theory and its 
relevance thereof. The ability of such an economic model to simulate an event as
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it would unwind in reality is at the epicentre of much discourse in many 
economic theory assumptions, as markets are continually hit by crises. Hence the 
arguments by scholars such as Spiegler and Milberg (2013) and Blinder (2014) to 
re-evaluate the merits of the current theoretical foundations of mainstream 
economics.
2.2.2 REVIEW OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS (EMH)
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is a theory on the informational 
efficiency of financial markets. Its core tenets are that investors form 
expectations rationally and markets aggregate information efficiently therefore 
equilibrium prices contain all aspects of available information (Busetti, 2009).
The EMH is categorised according to three forms namely weak form, semi­
strong form and strong form (Fama, 1970). Weak form claims that all past 
information has been priced into asset values. Thus in the context of financial 
markets a trader using technical analysis may not be able to capture excess 
returns. However use of some fundamental analysis may provide a trader with 
excess returns (Fama, 1970; Goodspeed, 2013). Semi-strong form is when all 
publicly available information is fully reflected in asset prices. Therefore both 
technical and fundamental analysis would be of no use in trying to capture excess 
returns (Fama, 1970; Goodspeed, 2013). Lastly the strong form states that all 
information available both public and private is fully reflected in asset prices, 
consequently even inside information cannot be used to capture any excess return 
(Fama, 1970; Goodspeed, 2013).
There are also three categories of efficiency suggested by EMH namely, 
operational efficiency, informational efficiency and allocational efficiency. 
Operational efficiency is where trading is carried out quickly, reliably and at 
minimum cost. Allocational efficiency is described as where resources or funds 
go towards their most productive use and lastly informational efficiency is where 
prices reflect all available information (Howells and Bain, 2008:572). The 
essence of EMH is price efficiency.
Asset prices have not entirely behaved in random patterns as alluded to by the 
theory. Securities do provide discernible patterns when analysed over time. As a
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result of the psychology of market participants, financial asset prices have a 
tendency to move in a trend. For example a downward trend in the price of 
BRICS countries debt instruments can be observed as credit ratings improved 
overtime. Similarly default spreads have been observed to show a tightening 
during such a period.
With the crux of the efficient market hypothesis being price efficiency the 
assumptions of EMH include frictionless markets and costless information. 
Furthermore the assumptions of EMH hold that security returns follow a random 
walk model and security prices are unpredictable by virtue of the unpredictability 
of news flow. However if the assumptions of EMH were to hold this would result 
in the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox.
Bailey (2005) describes the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox as the assertion that if 
information was freely available and common to all investors, then investors 
would acquire information to the point where marginal costs equal the marginal 
benefits. This would be due to the inferences investors could make from the price 
of an asset as it contains all available information. Thus because the acquisition 
of information is costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect all available information 
as those who spent resources in the acquisition of the information would not 
receive any compensation (Bailey, 2005: 72). The implications of the paradox 
therefore are; a state of strong form efficiency is a rarity and markets should be 
aware of information asymmetries.
The efficient market hypothesis follows from a previous theory on asset pricing 
known as the martingale theory. According to Bailey (2005) the martingale 
theory is one of the oldest and most known theories on asset pricing. The theory 
can be summarised using the following expression:
E[Pj t + i |Qt] > Pjt (1)
This states that the expected price of asset j in the next time period t+1 will be 
determined by an information set omega (Q) in the current time period. The 
information set omega includes past price trends of asset j  and other information 
such as company earnings etc. (Fama, 1970; Bailey, 2005: 79). The use of 
information in determining current and future price trends of assets in financial
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markets has been a concept mulled over up to its current state where it is used to 
explain market efficiency. However whether these theories, which predominantly 
subscribe to neoclassical economics, can sufficiently explain how markets 
conduct themselves is an on-going debate among academic scholars.
Variants of theories explaining market efficiency have been investigated as a 
result of the perceived flaws in the efficient market hypothesis. One of those 
variants is the adaptive markets hypothesis (AMH). The AMH considers varying 
degrees of market efficiency. According to Urquhart and Hudson (2013) the 
adaptive market hypothesis provides for three practical implications in finance 
namely: (i) it allows for risk premia to vary over time as a result of the stock 
market environment and the demographics of the investors in the market; (ii) 
allows for arbitrage opportunities to exist in the market, therefore active liquid 
markets imply the existence of profit opportunities, however these opportunities 
are exploited and so disappear. The corollary is that new opportunities are 
continuously being created and lastly investment strategies are (un)successful as 
a result of the environment of the particular market (Urquhart and Hudson, 2013: 
1-2).
2.2.3 REVIEW OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (CRA)
Credit rating agencies are a product of the 20th century and have been functioning 
since 1909. Moody’s Investor Services has been rating since 1909 and an 
amalgam of agencies that formed Standard & Poor’s (S&P) have been rating since 
1922 (Cantor and Packer, 1996).
These two agencies were the dominant agencies before the ascendance of Fitch 
Ratings. Both Moody’s and S&P used to grade any tradable financial instrument 
irrespective of whether the issuer requested such rating in the US, but have since 
moved to a user pays principle (Maas, 2011; Smith and Fryer, 2012). The user- 
pay principle meant clients would pay for an assessment. This has created an 
industry wrought by conflicts of interest and perverse incentives. The apparent 
faults within the credit rating industry are amplified by the fact that globally three 
rating agencies command the largest portion of market share thus creating a troika 
oligopoly (Maas, 2011).
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The main premise of credit rating agencies is to compress large quantities of 
public and non-public information with the aim of disseminating it for the benefit 
of the investing community. The information provides detail of the 
creditworthiness of the issuer. The emphasis on informational issues preceded the 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach discussed herein. As information 
was crucial to market conduct, CRAs in their design were supposed to contribute 
to solving the principal-agent problem caused by asymmetric information and in 
the process ameliorating risks concerned with adverse selection and moral hazard. 
By making such information public CRAs also were to assist with reducing 
redundancy and the cost thereof to lenders (Smith and Fryer, 2012).
Credit ratings were viewed as forward looking indicators of the relative risk of an 
issuer’s ability to service debt obligations but subsequently empirical studies 
found rating agencies to be lagging indicators and therefore not introducing much 
new information to the markets (Amadou, 2002; Mora, 2005). The rise to 
prominence of CRAs can be attributed to two events. Firstly there was a shift in 
policy regimes from Keynes and Minsky’s disposition of endogenous instability 
in financial markets to the neoclassical belief of efficient financial markets. 
Keynes and Minsky believed in the regulation of markets by government as they 
deemed markets to be inherently unstable. Classical economic beliefs are that 
government intervention inhibits markets that are already efficient and can 
manage to self-equilibrate.
Secondly there was the emergence of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), 
which postulates markets have informational efficiency and that market prices are 
optimally set by rational utility maximizing agents (Crotty, 2011). The 
presupposition given by EMH affirms the beliefs given by classical economics. 
This new shift provided an impetus to a new globally integrated and deregulated 
form of neoliberal capitalism. This would be known as the New Financial 
Architecture (NFA).
The NFA refers to the integration of modern day financial markets with light 
government regulation (Crotty, 2008). Most of the radical deregulation took place 
during the era of the Great Moderation in the late 1980s, continuing until the 
global financial crisis. The repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act that regulated the
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separation of commercial and investment banking activities proved to be a 
catalyst (Crotty, 2009; Stiglitz, 2009). This created grounds for the NFA based on 
lax regulation of commercial banks, investment banks and the other financial 
institutions to permeate. In tandem with neoclassical financial economics there 
was great financialisation of world economies. The NFA at its core is the belief 
that unregulated financial markets are efficient (Crotty, 2008). Thus Crotty (2008) 
and Stiglitz (2009) denounce the NFA as based on weak theoretical foundations 
due to its reliance on the assumption of neoclassical theory concerning capital 
markets ability to price securities and sufficiently allocate risk to those capable of 
managing it. The results of the NFA can be seen by the increase in speculative 
capital movement by financial firms directed at risky but high return assets. None 
the less the advocates of the NFA and of financialisation of economies, especially 
developing ones, continue to argue that there is a relationship between a 
deregulated global financial structure and economic development.
Moreover with the institutionalisation of CRAs, regulatory changes to banks’ 
capital requirements according to the Basel accords (Basel I), required banks to 
hold capital against risk weighted assets. CRAs determined the risk weights on 
these assets. This had been further solidified under the Basel II accord. Basel II 
regulatory requirements calculated risk according to two prescribed methods. The 
Standardized Approach (SA) and the Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRBA) 
(Elkhoury, 2009). The standardized approach provides for the measurement of 
risk using external credit assessment institutions namely CRAs (Elkhoury, 2009). 
Basel III and IV have done very little to mitigate the use of CRA’s.
Credit rating agencies have expanded into emerging markets moving from their 
home terrain of mainly the United States of America (USA). Since 1994 credit 
rating agencies have been rating developing countries. The agencies have however 
been accused of procyclicality, contributing to the boom and bust of the business 
cycle in developing countries. Despite this, credit ratings remain a key 
determinant of sovereign bond pricing. This is as a result of institutional 
investor’s close monitoring of issued credit ratings due to investment restrictions. 
Big institutional investors like collective investment schemes (CIS) i.e. pension 
funds etc are obliged by mandates that govern in which financial securities to 
invest in, to use credit ratings as a definitive guide for a security’s quality
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assurance. Furthermore credit ratings of the banking institutions in developing 
countries are highly correlated to sovereign ratings. This has the potential to affect 
the integrity of developing country’s financial systems.
The conduct of CRAs has been called to question post the financial crisis. 
According to Chandrasekhar (2013) and Smith and Fryer (2012) the conflicts of 
interests, as a result of the user-pay principle, have altered the rating agencies’ 
ability to act as reliable intermediaries of information. King and Sinclair (2003) 
argue that rating agencies are serving to privatise policy-making thereby 
encroaching on the responsibility of government. This is due to the fact that 
governments in developing countries feel compelled to implement policies that 
would reduce their country’s sovereign risk forsaking policies for sustained 
economic growth (Giselle, 2004). According to Smith and Fryer (2012) this 
compulsion felt by developing country governments to improve sovereign ratings 
can lead to overly tight macroeconomic policy. Within the BRICS countries both 
Brazil and Russia have seen rating downgrades below investment grade as a result 
of policy issues and growth concerns.
South Africa has since also received warnings from credit rating agencies to 
maintain fiscal prudence, policy certainty and create a business friendly 
environment in order to keep an investment grade rating (BDlive, 2016). Rating 
agencies are regarded to have quasi veto over government policy due to the 
influence they possess on private investors and they therefore impede 
developmental policies being pursued by developing nations in favour of more 
capital friendly policies (Giselle, 2004). As a result, the combination of credit 
rating agencies and global capital, can effectively ‘discipline’ the state by voting 
through rating endorsements and/or investor appetite and in a way force 
government to adopt certain policies in line with market expectation (Giselle, 
2004). King and Sinclair further say that efforts to incorporate the outputs of 
rating agencies into plans towards decreasing global financial volatility are flawed 
(King and Sinclair, 2003: 346). Events such as the 2008 global financial crisis 
(GFC) vindicate the likes of Crotty, King and Sinclair in their persistence against 
highly liberated markets and over reliance on private mechanisms to provide 
market stability without the intervention of governments.
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2.3 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
2.3.1 CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
Rating agencies have a major impact on developing countries. Armed with only 
an opinion, rating agencies can influence capital flows into developing countries 
and the momentum of the flow in either direction. These agencies have managed 
to commercialise risk by performing the duties of risk profiling.
They have since perpetuated the concept of the emerging market premium on 
developing nations. This not only raises the cost of finance for emerging markets 
but the emerging market tag induces volatility within those markets. Investors are 
happy to provide capital inflows during the early stages of euphoria while in 
search of high yields. However they violently withdraw capital at the slightest 
indication of bad news setting in motion events that can cause financial distress in 
these economies.
The sovereign ratings also create an upper bound limit for corporate entities 
domiciled within developing countries known as the sovereign ceiling (Smith and 
Fryer, 2012). Such an action potentially inhibits companies in developing 
countries from raising finance at adequate capital costs regardless of sound 
financial standing.
There is a substantial amount of empirical literature making use of predictive 
models to ascertain the effect of credit ratings on financial instruments in issue. 
Much of the literature looks at the factors that are considered when determining 
ratings. For example Cantor and Packer (1996) found that per capita GDP, 
inflation, levels of external debt and default history etc. were significant 
determinants of sovereign ratings. Ferri, Lui and Stiglitz (1999) and Mora (2006) 
also echoed the significance of macroeconomic fundamentals such as deficits, 
growth and national debt. Other scholarly authors such as Reinhart (2001) tested 
the performance of ratings in comparison to economic fundamentals as predictors 
of impending financial crisis and concluded ratings to be the worst predictors of 
crisis over economic indicators. Thus the conclusion made by many is that ratings 
are in effect lagging indicators as opposed to forward indicators of an issuer’s 
default.
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Since the Asian crises there has been a resurgence of literature into emerging 
markets and the impact of credit ratings thereof. Amadou (2002) used panel 
regressions of a simple univariate model on ratings to analyse the statistical 
differences between actual bond spreads and rating changes and concluded a 
notch increase in credit ratings decreased bond yields for emerging markets by 
14% on average. Jamaramillo and Tejada (2011), who also use a panel framework 
to test the hypothesis whether ratings matter in emerging markets, found that 
investment grade status does in fact lower bond spreads.
This is considered a sign of approval by the markets. Thus there has been an 
observed inverse relationship between ratings and bond yield spreads. However 
rating agencies are known for exacerbating the swings in the business cycle and 
therefore add to procyclicality.
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), using panel regressions and event studies, 
concluded that credit ratings contribute to contagion especially in emerging 
markets as changes in another emerging market can trigger spill over effects to 
other emerging markets. Also in times of crisis changes in ratings or outlook have 
a stronger effect on domestic markets as perceived credit risk increases. Lastly 
fragile economies as measured by the credit rating agencies are more vulnerable 
to events in developed countries for example a change in US interest rates.
In a study done by Mora (2006) it was concluded that ratings rather exhibit 
stickiness and only adjust when there is a sufficiently large deviation from 
predicted future ratings by market participants, as opposed to assigned ratings by 
the agencies. Thus one can conclude that ratings in effect follow market 
sentiment, once again suggesting that ratings are lagging indicators. Literature on 
developing countries and the apparent faults within the credit rating industry 
highlight the decline in rating quality as these agencies attempt to increase their 
market share by providing favourable ratings to clients (Becker and Milbourne, 
2011).
2.3.2 THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
Empirical literature on the EMH is inundated with tests of the weak form. There 
has been varying conclusions in support of EMH while others question whether
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the models used are misspecified and thereby inadvertently support the 
assumptions of the EMH. There has also been dissenting voices that discredit the 
efficient market hypothesis and its theoretical foundations.
Efficient markets under the EMH are assumed to follow a random walk model 
which renders asset returns unpredictable. However the phenomena of mean 
reversion in markets would seem to suggest that asset prices follow trends. The 
astute investor can therefore follow such trends and make profits through mere 
observation of past prices and making future inferences.
According to Brown (2011) there has been an accumulation of evidence from 
Fama himself from his seminal papers suggesting EMH fails empirically to 
describe how markets work in reality (Brown, 2011: 2). Brown (2011) conducts a 
similar event study to Fama (1970) using stock splits to investigate the 
implications concerning informational efficiency asserted by EMH and whether 
event studies lend themselves to biases when testing for evidence of EMH. Brown 
(2011) concludes that the results show a mixed bag as a result of ex post 
conditioning which results in anomalies. He however concedes that EMH cannot 
foresee bubbles and collapses.
Lee et al (2010) conduct a study to demonstrate whether different levels of 
economic and capital market development will show the same evidence of the 
efficient markets hypothesis. Using panel stationarity tests with and without 
structural break, Lee et al (2010) conclude that in developed countries the 
efficient market hypothesis does not hold. Lee et al also conclude that similarly 
security prices in developing countries do not exhibit the behavioural patterns 
assumed by the efficient market hypothesis.
Urquhart and Hudson (2013) use tests of linear dependence and non-linear 
dependence to establish degrees of market efficiency. They make use of data from 
the US, UK and Japanese stock indices. By dividing the data into five half a 
decade subsamples they test for the following stated goals: efficient markets, 
markets moving towards efficiency, markets switching from efficiency to 
inefficiency, adaptive markets and efficient markets. They achieve their goals by 
monitoring any autocorrelation between security returns. Urquhart and Hudson 
(2010) conclude that the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) in both linear and
18
non-linear tests has gone through periods of predictable and trended returns and 
unpredictable returns supporting the proposition of an adaptive markets 
hypothesis. Furthermore Urquhart and Hudson (2010) show that the Financial 
Times 30 (FT30) provides mixed results with the linear tests for dependence such 
as the tests for autocorrelation supporting the AMH. Similarly tests on the TOPIX 
suggest that the market is adaptive.
Brenner (1979) also employs stock splits to test for the sensitivity of empirical 
studies to capital markets (Brenner, 1979: 917). Using a number of different 
models such as the one factor Sharpe-Linter model of generating returns and the 
Cumulative Average Residuals (CAR) model to test for market efficiency, 
Brenner concludes that he cannot achieve a clear result and possibly the market 
models used could be misspecified. He remarks that maybe results validating the 
EMH may be conditional on the market model employed (Brenner, 1979: 928).
Munir et al (2012) investigate the behaviour of Southeast Asian stock indices 
namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. Using a 
threshold autoregressive method Munir et al (2012) conclude that returns on the 
Malaysian and Thailand stock are not predictable and are characterised by a 
random walk. This would be in agreement with EMH principles. However they 
find with the stock markets of the Philippines and Singapore there is evidence of 
mean reversion rejecting the principles of EMH. They finally conclude that 
developing countries do not possess well established financial systems. 
Furthermore developing countries suffer more frequently from political and 
economic instability hence their stock markets cannot be expected to be efficient 
continuously.
2.4 CONCLUSION
From the review of literature above one can observe the evolution in theoretical 
foundations that are used to explain how markets function and the behaviour of 
market participants. The rational expectations hypothesis tries to explain the 
behaviour of market participants with the use of the assumption that these 
participants use all available information to inform beliefs. This theory however 
has had little success in predicting crises as a result of its emphasis on individual 
beliefs. The theory seems to also fail to explain the processes investors go through
19
when making decisions. Some scholars view rational expectations as an extension 
of neoclassical economic theory with close relations to the efficient market 
hypothesis.
Moreover, theories trying to explain market informational efficiency have been 
evolving from theories like the martingale theory to the efficient market 
hypothesis. Much like the rational expectations hypothesis, EMH has had very 
little success in predicting financial downturns or explaining investor actions. 
Evidence in support of the EMH concludes with a mixed bag of results. Variants 
of the EMH are emerging as the schools of thought evolve with prevailing market 
conditions.
With a globally deregulated financial system there is pervasive use of credit rating 
agencies. These agencies established themselves a niche as information 
intermediaries. Their purpose was to create market stability with a more reliable 
flow of information. It has since been argued that they in fact increased 
procyclicality in markets and have exacerbated the effects of the business cycle. 
Markets in their very nature are dynamic and evolve with the times and economic 
environment in which they exist. Naturally the theoretical frameworks that 
underpin how the markets function will have to continuously evolve to reflect the 
non-static nature of markets.
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CHAPTER 3
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO 
BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
CONDITIONS.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will provide a theoretical and empirical review of behavioural 
finance and the conditions prevailing within global financial markets, namely the 
global savings glut and accommodative monetary policy such as quantitative 
easing. Behavioural finance provides an alternative theoretical framework to 
assess the anomalies with regards to asset pricing as a result of the behaviour of 
economic actors. This is particularly important for emerging market assets which 
include assets from the BRICS countries.
Recently there has been a divergence between fundamentals and capital market 
performance. For instance in the context of the South African economy a 
dichotomy exists where weak macroeconomic fundamentals prevail however the 
capital markets appear to be outperforming domestic GDP growth. The analysis 
on behavioural finance as a paradigm will provide an insight into the impact of the 
psychology of market actors within financial markets and the subsequent effects 
on security pricing. This is done by analysing how market participants gather 
information and use it in the decision making process.
The inexplicable divergence in emerging market asset prices can also be 
attributable to the advent of a loose global monetary policy environment that has 
given rise to excess liquidity within global financial markets. This liquidity has 
created distortions in security prices in major financial centres globally. The 
extremely accommodating monetary policy has been as a result of the global 
financial crisis.
The crisis left most developed economies reeling from the crash of the housing 
bubble, depressing global growth and output. The chapter is organized as follows 
Section 3.2.1 discusses behavioural finance theory. Section 3.2.2 provides a
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theoretical background to global liquidity. Section 3.3 provides an empirical 
analysis of global liquidity caused by accommodative US monetary policy and 
section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
3.2.1 REVIEW OF BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE THEORY
Financial economic theory is largely based on the concept of the economic man 
also known as homo economicus. This is the belief in rational economic actors 
and utility maximizing agents (Brabazon, 2000: 2; Botha et al, 2008: 94). These 
agents have the uncanny ability to make unbiased forecasts concerning the future, 
as has been discussed in the previous chapter. However this view of economic 
agents has not been able to consistently explain the decisions and actions taken by 
economic agents in markets. Market participant behaviour determines whether 
asset prices are largely representative of fair value or are distorted. Continuous 
volatility in risk sentiment can cause great fluctuations in asset prices. Hence the 
establishment of behavioural finance theory as a paradigm which proposes an 
alternative argument towards understanding the behaviour of market participants.
Behavioural finance supplements existing theory on the decision making process 
of market participants. Botha et al (2008) assert that investors are limited by three 
boundaries in their decision making abilities. These boundaries are; the investor’s 
cognition which is the way people organise information and the resultant way of 
thinking that may be prone to errors, the investor’s emotion which is the way they 
feel when they receive information and the investor’s social environment which 
relates to the pressures the investor finds himself in (Howells and Bain, 2008: 98).
According to Ritter (2003) behavioural finance is premised on two foundations 
namely limits to arbitrage and cognitive psychology. Howells and Bain (2008) 
describe the foundations of behavioural finance as practical limits to arbitrage and 
investor sentiment (Howells and Bain, 2008: 585). Barberis (2011) categorizes 
behavioural finance theory according to investor beliefs and preferences.
The first foundation of behavioural finance is with regards to limits to arbitrage. 
Arbitrage can be defined as a discrepancy in an asset’s price in two different 
markets, which allows for riskless profits as an economic actor can buy (long) the
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asset in the market where it is cheap and sell (short) it in the market where it is 
priced higher. According to Barberis and Thaler (2003) persistent mispricing in 
markets is evidence of limits to arbitrage therefore if arbitrage was not limited the 
mispricing would disappear. Financial markets are littered with examples of 
arbitrageurs who perceived an opportunity and in their attempt to exploit these 
opportunities made losses to the point of capitulation.
The most famous example is that of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
who saw an opportunity in the shares of Royal Dutch Shell trading out of parity in 
their respective domicile markets namely the UK, Netherlands and USA. When 
Royal Dutch and Shell merged, Royal Dutch owned 60% of the merged entity and 
Shell the remaining 40%. Both Royal Dutch and Shell maintained separate listings 
in their respective markets. Albeit LTCM maintained the correct view of the 
separately listed shares, market sentiment that drove the divergence continued. 
Eventually in 1998 LTCM capitulated and only in 2001 did prices of Royal Dutch 
and Shell trade at parity (Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Ritter, 2003; Lo, 2005).
The second foundation is cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychology suggests 
that the decision making process is subject to certain biases. Behavioural finance 
scholars categorises these biases into two components namely heuristic decision 
processes and prospect theory. Accordingly, the heuristic decision process 
includes the following biases; representativeness, availability, overconfidence and 
anchoring
Representativeness is described as the tendency for investors to make decisions 
based on stereotypes and extracting patterns that are non-existent in the data 
(Brabazon, 2000; Ritter, 2003; Sewell, 2007). This condition is sometimes 
referred to as the use of heuristics or rules of thumb. The most common biases as 
a result of heuristics are the law of small numbers and the base rate neglect effect. 
The law of small numbers refers to the tendency by investors to draw conclusions 
from limited data sets.
While the base rate-neglect effect is when investors place too much emphasis on 
similarities between market events and neglect unrelated variables that could 
impact the outcome of their investment decision (Botha et al, 2008). For example 
it is commonly stated that in times of turmoil gold as a store of value is a safe
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investment therefore people would hold gold stocks neglecting to look at variables 
like company management, quality of assets, cost and capital structure etc. that 
would affect the value of a gold firm rather than the value of physical gold. These 
biases have major implications for emerging market assets, for instance these 
biases may lead to herd behaviour regarding EM assets as a result of limited data. 
Such behaviour could lead to bubble or contagion effects for emerging market 
assets. Instances of such behaviour taking place in markets includes the strong 
performances exhibited by commodity exporting countries that is correlated to a 
strong performance of the Chinese economy and the inverse when Chinese GDP 
growth falters. In such instances the fundamentals of the commodity exporting 
country are neglected for improved prospects associated to trade linkages. 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) describe the phenomena of herding to be when 
individuals are in informational cascades. This they describe as observational 
learning by individuals whereby they observe the actions of others, their payoffs 
and these observations become so informative that the individual’s actions are not 
representative of their own private signals (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003: 4-5).
The availability bias refers to the reliance by investors to use the most available 
information in their decision making process regardless of the accuracy of the 
information (Brabazon, 2000; Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Sewell, 2007). 
According to Botha et al (2008) there are four categories of availability bias 
namely retrievability, categorisation, narrow range of experience and resonance. 
Retrievability is investors regard as credible, information that is easily retrievable. 
Categorisation is the classification of information by its users in order to easily 
recall it. Narrow range experience refers to investors having little reference to 
retrieve information in order to make an objective decision and therefore they 
choose investments in sectors or markets they are most familiar with.
Lastly resonance is when investors buy investments that suit their personality 
(Botha et al, 2008: 104). These biases show that investors place huge weighting 
on sentiment in their decision making process thereby creating market movements 
not bound by rationality.
The overconfidence bias is the confidence investors have in their own ability and 
confidence in the information they hold (Brabazon, 2000: Ritter, 2003: Barberis
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and Thaler, 2003). In most literature it is stated that this condition is dominant in 
entrepreneurs and males as opposed to their female counterparts. According to 
Botha et al (2008) overconfidence can manifest in two ways; by creating a 
knowledge illusion and creating a control illusion (Botha, 2008:112).
Lastly the anchoring bias is described by Brabazon (2000) and Sewell (2007) as 
the fixing of expectations due to recent observations. This has the effect of leading 
investors to believe that a security will continue to trade at a defined range in line 
with historical trends. Anchoring could result in a divergence in asset prices as 
past trends are extrapolated into the future. For example the expectations for the 
Chinese economy may appear to have been anchored around high growth rates in 
excess of seven percent annually albeit these rates are off a high base. Therefore 
when Chinese growth went below these levels, a stock market rout took place 
prompting Chinese authorities to implement radical policies to stem capital 
outflows such as the devaluation of the renminbi, preventing short selling and 
having state owned financial companies pick up the slack to buoy the capital 
markets.
Defining behavioural finance theory from the perspective of Barberis (2011), 
behavioural finance is also based on two foundations namely investor beliefs and 
investor preferences. From the belief side three main theories exist according to 
Barberis. These include investors’ disagreement about future prospects and 
possible short sale constraints. Secondly investors extrapolate past trends too far 
into the future and lastly investor overconfidence. The belief based theory shares 
similar concerns as those mentioned previously by Ritter (2003). The other 
cornerstone on which Barberis asserts behavioural finance theory is based on is 
investor preferences.
The preference based model asserts that after investors experience gains they 
become less risk averse as a result of wealth gains. This is known as the house 
money effect (Barberis, 2011: 4). The reduced risk aversion leads to more 
enthusiastic buying of financial securities leading to overvalued securities. The 
other argument of the preference based model is that investors have an affinity to 
lottery-like payoffs where the investors place high weighting on low probabilities 
(Barberis, 2011: 4). The gamble can cause distortions in financial asset prices.
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Traditional finance theories maintain investors have unbounded rationality and 
maximise expected utility. Expected utility theory was proposed by the likes of 
Bernoulli and von Neumann and Morgenstein. Using complex mathematical 
derivations these scholars were able to explain decision making under uncertainty 
(Barberis and Thaler, 2003: 1067). Behavioural finance provides a critique of 
expected utility theory and offers an alternate explanation in assessing decisions 
under uncertainty. According to Prast (2004) the theory of expected utility 
maximisation does not hold in practice thus prospect theory’s ability to explain 
investor behaviour better.
Hede (2012), Barberis and Thaler (2003) state that prospect theory is a 
mathematically formulated alternative to the expected utility theory. With 
prospect theory values are assigned to gains and losses rather than final asset 
values (Prast, 2004; Hede, 2012). According to Prast (2004) the decision making 
process consists of two stages namely editing and evaluation. In the editing stage 
people frame their prospects in terms of gains and losses relative to a given 
benchmark. Moreover probabilities are replaced by decision weights (Barberis 
and Thaler, 2003:1068; Prast, 2004; Hede, 2012:13). This takes place in the 
evaluation stage where only prospects with the highest values are chosen with the 
assistance of heuristics.
Further contrast to utility theory is seen on the value function used to describe 
individual investor behaviour. Expected utility theory gives a concave function 
that depicts investor behaviour as risk averse, with decreasing marginal utility 
from continued gains in wealth and greater declines in utility as wealth falls.
Prospect theory, by contrast, has a downward sloping value function for wealth 
gains beyond a reference point and an upward sloping function beneath the 
reference point (Hede, 2012: 14). The reference point is the desired amount of 
wealth. While prospect theory agrees with utility theory above the reference point, 
below the reference point investor behaviour appears to be risk loving. Thus 
investors are risk seekers below their desired levels of wealth.
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3.2.2 REVIEW OF THE GLOBAL LIQUIDITY GLUT AND
QUANTITATIVE EASING
The surge in global liquidity in recent years is said to be predicated on 
unconventional monetary policy (UMP) and the global savings glut (GSG). As a 
result of the global financial crisis, central banks around the world and 
particularly the United States had to deploy unorthodox monetary policy to 
counteract the effects of the crisis. Countries like the US, Japan and the Euro area 
reduced domestic interest rates to near zero levels and injected stimulus into their 
economies in an attempt to create a demand shock through the credit channel 
(Klyuev, 2009). The use of unconventional policies originated in the US, the 
centre of the financial crisis. In 2008 the Federal Reserve Bank announced an 
ambitious programme to stave off a banking sector collapse and maintain stability 
in the US financial system by instituting the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP). The programme constituted the buying of ‘toxic assets’ to the tune of 
$700 billion (Taylor, 2011). This programme, aimed at controlling the macro 
economy through conventional policy (interest rates) and unconventional policy 
(TARP), would later be known as quantitative easing (QE).
The outcomes of QE were a surplus of low cost funding in global capital markets 
which resulted in great vulnerability to global financial markets. Economic actors 
engaged in ‘carry’ trading as opportunities to leverage and gain high yields from 
emerging market assets arose. As a result of the crisis central banks in the larger 
more developed markets created large amounts of liquidity. With yields in 
developed markets at record lows speculators directed flows to emerging markets.
These capital flows created vulnerabilities in EM countries as they can be 
virulently withdrawn as a result of changes in sentiment due to investor 
perception. This was evidenced by the currency crises that ensued in emerging 
markets in the 90’s and more recently the effects of US Federal Reserve chairman 
pronouncements on the reduction of quantitative easing known as tapering. The 
volatility experience by the markets as a result of possible US interest rate 
normalisation and tapering became known as the taper tantrum (Taylor, 2011).
Another factor that is said to have caused excess liquidity that inadvertently found 
itself chasing yields in emerging market assets is the global savings glut. This
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hypothesis was proposed by the then Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke. 
Bernanke hypothesised that as a result of prior financial crises emerging market 
countries adopted new ways to handle international capital flows (Bernanke, 
2005). This he states attributed to a growing current account deficit in the United 
States which corresponded with a growing surplus with the world (Bertocco, 
2014).
This accumulation by developing countries of reserves which comprise of dollar 
and/or US government securities, depressed yields in the United States prior to the 
policy of quantitative easing taking place. This is said to have affected the 
decision to save by US citizens.
According to Bertocco (2014), Bernanke states this happened through two 
channels, (i) the increases in US citizen wealth as a result of foreign flows that 
boosted technology stocks decreased the citizens’ propensity to save as wealth 
increased (ii) the bursting of the technology bubble in the early 2000’s halted 
investments in the US and with liquidity remaining in place depressed yields in 
the US therefore decreasing the propensity to save by US citizens.
Apart from developing nations accumulating savings Bernanke (2005) asserts that 
oil producing nations were also able to accumulate savings on the back of the 
sharp increases in the oil prices. Furthermore developed nations like Japan and 
Germany had also accumulated large tranches of savings due to a largely aging 
population.
All these factors affected both global liquidity and real interest rates in the United 
States as a result of a growing global imbalance in capital flows (Bracke and 
Fidora, 2008; Bertocco, 2014). Bracke and Fidora (2008) dispute the hypothesis 
provided by Bernanke and explore an alternate explanation that could have caused 
global liquidity. This includes; the monetary approach which portrays global 
liquidity as a result of low interest rates which initiated the hunt for yield and 
declines in risk aversion and the non-monetary approach which portrays global 
liquidity as a result of real factors such as desired savings and investment 
decisions, concurring with Bernanke.
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Summers (2014) assert that the imbalance seen is a result of a concept known as 
secular stagnation. This would then attribute the imbalance as a fault of what 
transpired in the US economy. Secular stagnation is based on two foundations 
namely the slowdown in population growth and technological progress (Summers, 
2014). Therefore with an increasingly ageing population there is an increasing 
propensity towards saving. However with slower technological progress there is a 
decreasing propensity to invest into capital projects. Thus the excess savings 
depress real interest rates and the reluctance to invest results in companies with 
cash flux balance sheets. Despite having different conditions, elements of secular 
stagnation are visible in the South African economy. Demographically there is a 
large percentage of the population that is considered as youth thus the country is 
in a more favourable position. However corporate SA has maintained balance 
sheets with cash hoards and is showing reluctance in investing locally. This may 
be as a result of structural and policy issues that have created uncertainty locally. 
Growth in South Africa has been anaemic as a result post the financial crisis.
The world continues to await direction from the Federal Reserve Bank on US 
interest rate normalisation. Volatility in emerging markets has since been on the 
rise. This level of volatility is reminiscent of the time the Federal Reserve 
announced the tapering of its toxic asset purchase program. According to Sahay et 
al (2014) announcements by the Fed were strongly correlated with movements in 
prices of assets and capital flows to emerging markets, especially during the initial 
introduction of unconventional monetary policy and the discussions on tapering.
However they point out that good macroeconomic fundamental were important 
factors considered by the markets when reacting.
29
3.3 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
3.3.1 US MONETARY POLICY
Emerging market countries are highly susceptible to events concerning the US 
economy. This is both in terms of monetary policy decisions or guiding 
announcements by US monetary authorities. This has made emerging market 
countries that are perceived to be less resilient to portfolio outflows, due to 
dependency on them, to experience volatility that has the potential to destabilise 
economic conditions domestically. According to Foley-Fisher and Guimaraes 
(2013) changes in US monetary policy affect emerging countries default risk by 
raising the opportunity cost for investors who then require a higher risk premium. 
This is as a result of developed markets being viewed as safer than the riskier 
emerging markets. Using a method of identification through heteroskedasticity 
Foley-Fisher and Guimareas (2013) conclude that a one basis point increase in 10 
year US treasuries increases the Emerging Market Bond Index plus premium 
(EMBI+) by the same amount thus indicating the rising risk of default for EM 
countries. Therefore the ‘flight to safety’ effect appears to have a significant 
impact on emerging market risk premia.
Hausman and Wongswan (2006) concur with Foley-Fisher and Guimareas. 
Hausman and Wongswan (2006) conducted an event study to assess whether 
FOMC announcements affect global asset prices (both developed and developing 
countries). They conclude that both monetary announcements and guidance from 
Fed statements affects global asset prices albeit the effects differ between asset 
classes. This they attribute to two probable reasons; (i) financial linkages - US 
investors owning financial assets outside of their home country and (ii) trade 
linkages with the United States. Indications are that US monetary authority 
announcements can trigger the flight to safety effect among US based investors 
thereby creating the need for a premium on emerging markets.
Uribe and Yue (2006) investigate the drivers of emerging market country spreads 
and conclude that US interest rate shocks account for 20% of the movement in 
activity in emerging countries from a business cycle perspective. This they say is 
transmitted to domestic variables via the effect on country spreads.
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Kamin and von Kleist (1999) hypothesise that increases in industrial country 
interest rates should have the effect of increasing EM countries debt burden for 
global issuances and thereby affecting the countries credit worthiness. This would 
filter to the risk appetite of global investors. However their results seem to suggest 
that variations in industrial country (US) interest rates appear to not have exerted 
much significant influence in EM country bond spreads and subsequently the 
credit risk of EM countries.
Andritzky et al (2005) finds that global debt markets respond strongly to changes 
in credit ratings and changes in US interest rates with regards to emerging markets 
due to the costs of funding. Thus emerging market debt spreads portray some 
form of volatility as a result. Yafeh et al (2002) conclude that there appears to be 
co-movement in the spreads of emerging market bonds mostly as a result of 
influences by global events. This seems to suggest that with greater financial 
integration the probability of contagion among emerging market countries has 
increased.
Arora and Cerisola (2001) argue that contagion is the result of investors who face 
liquidity constraints in one emerging market and therefore the investor withdraws 
liquidity from another more liquid market. Many other scholars echo similar 
sentiments concerning the effect of US monetary policy on emerging market 
financial instruments. These include Alper (2006), Eichengreen and Mody (1998) 
and Panyanukul (2009). According to Panyanukul (2009) not only do 
developments in the US markets affect asset pricing in other countries but 
liquidity risk and liquidity levels can account for a 100 basis point difference in 
yields in bond spreads between countries with differing liquidity risk profiles. 
Stahel (2003) concurs by asserting that shocks to aggregate liquidity may 
command a positive risk premium in assets.
3.4 CONCLUSION
The evidence gathered from the literature study above provides insights to 
possible factors that are currently affecting markets and could contribute to a new 
financial crisis among emerging market countries. Emerging markets usually bear 
the brunt of the effects of crisis emanating from developed markets. From the 
literature we can see how the psychology of investors affects the decision making
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process of investors. A bias appears to be in place for emerging markets that 
requires additional risk premiums to be adjusted for due to the perception of 
investors domiciled in developed markets.
Most importantly the literature shows that investors do not contain unbounded 
rationality and can base their decision on factors that do not maximise their utility. 
Investors can forgo their own private signals and observe the signals of others and 
ultimately conclude an action not in accordance with their desired outcome. This 
poses a risk to emerging markets as investor decisions can lead to contagion 
effects and become a destabilising factor in developing economies. This can be 
attested to by the 1997/98 Russian and Asian crisis that resulted in contagion 
among emerging markets. The corollary is that developed markets have become a 
proxy for safe assets in times of turmoil. Therefore US monetary policy is an 
important factor in emerging market asset pricing.
As a result of the crisis emanating from the US, the policy undertaken by the 
country’s monetary authority has resulted in excess liquidity in capital markets 
that is continuously searching for yield. These portfolio flows which have found 
their way into emerging market assets pose a risk to emerging market economies 
as have been evidenced by the volatility surrounding the Federal Reserve 
announcements on a number of occasions. These announcements were concerning 
the ending of the bond purchasing program that gave stimulus to the markets. 
Also the recent announcements’ to normalize US interest rates and embark on a 
hiking cycle have resulted in much volatility in emerging markets. Market 
participants trying anticipate the Fed interest rate hike and in the process 
rebalancing their portfolios by moving out of perceived riskier EM assets into safe 
haven assets, are creating concerns for emerging market monetary authorities.
The withdrawal of these portfolio flows poses a threat to emerging market 
currencies and ultimately increases developing countries credit risk as weaker 
currencies will result in more expensive debt to be serviced. With the prevailing 
global macroeconomic slow down, idiosyncratic risks in emerging markets will 
add more pressure on these economies creating fertile grounds for an emerging 
market crisis.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the statistical and econometric models that 
are to be used in order to achieve the objectives as set out in Chapter One. The 
study will empirically assess the relationship between BRICS countries credit 
default swap spreads and investor sentiment, sovereign ratings, stock returns, 
inflation and developed country monetary policy. India is omitted from the study 
due to the absence of data on credit default swaps (Neuenkirch et al, 2010). The 
chapter is organised as follows; section 4.2 outlines the period of the study, the 
type of data used and the sources of the data. Section 4.3 discusses the variables 
used. Section 4.4 sets out the tests used in order to determine whether the 
variables in the model are stationary. Section 4.5 provides the specification of the 
model used.
4.2 PERIOD OF STUDY, TYPE AND DATA SOURCES
The data used to conduct this study is a panel dataset comprising monthly time 
series data spanning from January 2003 to the month of July 2015 for four cross 
sectional groups. The data is for the BRICS countries. Data for the dependent 
variable, namely credit default swap spreads, was obtained as month-end values 
from Bloomberg. The explanatory variables, which include the volatility index 
(VIX) used as a proxy for global investor sentiment, inflation and BRICS 
countries stock returns were also obtained from Bloomberg, country credit ratings 
were obtained from Moody’s Investor Services and the US Federal funds rate data 
was obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Interactive dummy variables are 
used to observe the effects of the crisis on the explanatory variables.
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4.3 D E FIN IT IO N  O F V A R IA BLE S
4.3.1 CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP SPREADS
The CDS data used comprises of US dollar denominated contracts with a 5 year 
maturity. Credit Default Swaps are financial contracts that offer insurance for 
losses suffered by the buyer as a result of a credit event (Neuenkirch et al, 2011; 
Faure, 2014). The subject of insurance is outstanding sovereign debt. According 
to Neuenkirch et al (2011) emerging market countries are at least ten times more 
vulnerable to defaulting than their developed counterparts. Therefore credit risk 
remains an important factor in pricing sovereign debt for emerging market 
borrowers. Accordingly, sovereign credit default swaps provide a reliable 
indication of the credit risk premium demanded by investors.
The basis of credit default swaps is to insure against the risk of bankruptcy of the 
reference entity and the resultant inability to pay thereafter. Ancillary risks 
accounted for in the instrument include when the entity’s debt has to be 
restructured, the entity is obliged to default or when the entity repudiates its 
obligation to pay (Neuenkirch et al, 2011). Standard contracts have two legs 
namely; a buyer purchases protection and compensates the protection seller. The 
protection purchaser pays periodic payments to the protection seller who in turns 
settles with the protection buyer when a credit event occurs such as a credit rating 
downgrade, bankruptcy, default etc (Neuenkirch, 2011; Faure, 2014). Thus 
increases in default swap spreads may reflect a rise in the probability of a 
‘technical’ default along with some transition risk such as a sovereign rating 
downgrade rather than actual principal losses on outstanding debt (Neuenkirch et 
al, 2011).
According to Longstaff et al (2007) default spreads are also affected by 
international events, particularly events in the US markets, therefore US monetary 
policy communications and action have a large economic influence on emerging 
market spreads as do credit ratings.
34
4.3.2 V O L A T IL IT Y  IN D E X  (V IX )
The volatility index (VIX) as compiled by the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
is a gauge of the risk appetite of international investors or the price of risk (Alper, 
2006; Ozatayo, 2007; Csonto and Ivaschenko, 2013). It is a measure popularly 
used to gauge the implied volatility of equity options on the S&P 500. The VIX is 
sometimes referred to as the fear index, therefore when markets experience some 
anxiety due to a significant event; there has been a traditional spike in the index’s 
volatility. This anxiety in the markets is generally as a result of market moving 
announcements on stocks or by institutions in charge of economic policy in the 
largely developed markets i.e. US monetary authority.
4.3.3 CREDIT RATINGS
Alper (2006) defines variables dealing with country specific fundamentals as 
‘pull’ factors as they are endogenous factors. Idiosyncratic factors are deemed 
‘pull’ factors due to borrowers competing on the soundness of these variables to 
attract capital (Alper, 2006). Alper uses credit ratings as a proxy for idiosyncratic 
risk to assess their impact on the EMBI+ premium. Credit ratings, as discussed 
earlier, are credit reports compiled by credit rating agencies. Rating agencies 
observe a number of variables that allow them to determine whether a sovereign 
states fiscal position, macroeconomic environment and external balances do not 
impair its ability to service debt obligations. These reports therefore state the 
credit worthiness of a country and largely influence whether large institutional 
investors, given their mandates, are at liberty to invest in debt instruments issued 
by a particular country. Empirical studies have generally found that better ratings 
are associated with improved sovereign yields. The studies depict an inverse 
relationship between ratings and sovereign bond yields (Cantor and Packer, 1996; 
Amadou, 2002; Jaramillo and Tejada, 2011).
Table 4.1 sets out the rating scale used by Moody’s. A rating below Baa3 is 
deemed to be sub-investment grade. This shows that the issuer has a high 
probability of default and their issued instrument is therefore deemed to be 
speculative.
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A rating above Baa3 shows that the financial instrument is of adequate quality to 
be invested in with lesser risk assigned to the probability of default. The highest 
rating attainable is Aaa while the lowest is a B3.
Table 4.1 Credit rating index based on Moody’s rating scale
M oody’s Assigned Logistic
Rating score transform ation
Aaa 16 2.773 INVESTM ENT
Aa1 15 2.015 GRADE
Aa2 14 1.540
Aa3 13 1.179
A1 12 0.875
A2 11 0.606
A3 10 0.357
Baa1 9 0.118
Baa2 8 -0.118
Baa3 7 -0.357
Ba1 6 -0.606 NON
Ba2 5 -0.875 INVESTM ENT
Ba3 4 -1.179 GRADE
B1 3 -1.540
B2 2 -2.015
B3 1 -2.773
Source: Moody’s Investor Services
4.3.4 US FEDERAL FUNDS RATE
In many studies the US interest rate is used as a proxy for both global liquidity 
and US monetary policy effects (Alper, 2006; Hausman and Wongswan, 2006; 
Ozatayo et al, 2010). Some studies use the 10 year US treasury rate as a proxy for 
US monetary policy and liquidity (Neuenkirch et al, 2011; Csonto and 
Ivaschenko, 2013). Alper (2006) describes the Federal funds rate as a ‘push’ 
factor along with investor sentiment to portray the exogeneity of these variables. 
Alper (2006) asserts that global liquidity conditions are deemed ‘push’ factors 
because low returns in developed financial markets pushes liquidity to high 
yielding emerging markets. For the purpose of this study the US Federal funds 
rate is used.
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4.3.5 ST O C K  R ETU R N S
To assess firm specific factors and control for market perception on emerging 
market returns, historical stock exchange returns in US dollars, of the four BRICS 
countries are used. The indices used are the countries main indices from the local 
bourses which include the JSE Top 40, the Brazilian Bovespa main index, the 
Chinese Shanghai Composite index and the Russian Micex. Investment returns 
have a profound effect on the flows directed at any financial instrument. 
Company earnings are also an indication of market conditions in the market in 
which the company is domicile and operates in. Therefore controlling for 
perceived market returns for these regional powerhouses will assist in ascertaining 
whether the actions taken by market participants, largely driven by valuations and 
sentiment towards the risks, have an impact on sovereign credit default swaps 
spreads.
4.3.6 INFLATION
Inflation is added as it affects the returns on fixed income securities. The real 
returns on fixed income securities, as dictated by the Fisher equation, are a 
function of nominal interest rates adjusted for inflation. Thus investors into this 
category of asset class seek returns that will sustain the purchasing power of their 
investable funds. Inflation also has a significant bearing on the macroeconomic 
environment of a country. Its effects are seen through the transmission mechanism 
where they eventually affect the monetary policy decision of policymakers. 
Whether the move in inflation is affected by cost-push factors (i.e. these factors 
tend to be exogenous for example global events that cause currency depreciation 
which then leads to higher factory gate prices for imported goods and higher 
prices for consumers) or are demand driven (endogenous factors), investors will 
adjust the required rate of return to account for the movement in inflation 
expectations. Inflation data for each member country is used.
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4.3.7 D U M M Y  V IA R IA B LE
The exact timing of the global financial crisis is a matter of debate. According to 
Brunnermeier (2008) the liquidity crisis that filtered through to the stock markets 
took shape in February 2007 with a sharp rise in subprime mortgage defaults. As 
the deterioration of mortgage backed securities continued, United Bank of 
Scotland (UBS) and Bear Sterns saw their internal hedge fund businesses 
capitulate as a result of losses associated with mortgage related products. During 
this time Moody’s initiated the downgrades to subprime mortgage deals. By June 
2007 Moody’s, S&P and Fitch all announced further downgrades of subprime 
products which unnerved financial markets. For the purpose of this study the 
crisis is therefore assumed to have begun at the end of the second quarter of 2007 
in July. To control for the crisis, equation 4.5 is adjusted. Dummy variables are 
inserted to control for the impact of the 2007/8 global financial crisis. A dummy 
variable is binary assuming two values namely 0, in this case for the pre-crisis 
period (prior July 2007) and 1 for the post crisis period. To test for the impact of 
the crisis on the dependent variable interactive dummy variables are used.
4.3.8 COMPUTATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS
As can be seen from Table 4.1 credit ratings are not a numeric score. To overcome 
this problem the credit ratings must be converted to a more numeric measure. 
Reinhart (2002) converts ratings to a scale of natural numbers ranging from 1-16. 
This conversion does not consider changes in outlook from positive, neutral and 
negative, of the ratings but considers actual changes in ratings. Alper (2006) uses 
a similar translation and constructs an index spanning 1-58 numbers.
This is due to his treatment of changes in outlook as an intermediate step between 
changes in ratings. In this article the method used is similar to the method 
implement by Reinhart (2002) and Smith and Fryer (2012) and does not account 
for changes in outlook. We subject the index to a logit-type transformation to 
account for possible nonlinearities in the rating scale. The transformation is done 
as follows:
Lt = ln ( ^ ) (4.1)
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Where It denotes the assigned index value from Moody’s Investors Services 
ratings.
4.4 TESTS FOR STATIONARITY
In order to estimate the model, properties of the panel dataset constructed must be 
explored. For variables that do not differ cross sectionally like the US federal 
funds rate and the volatility index, univariate unit root tests are used. Traditional 
unit root tests used are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the 
Kwiatowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. Unit root testing is conducted in 
order to explore whether the model used produces a spurious regression (Hill et 
al, 2012).
The ADF test is estimated as follows (Gujarati, 2006):
b y t = «  +  y y t + as Ayt_s +  v t (4 .2 )
The hypothesis (null) tested here is that the series is non-stationary (i.e. H0: 7 = 0, 
has unit root) against the alternative hypothesis the series is stationary (i.e. 
Ha: y < 0). Therefore if the null hypothesis should be rejected the conclusion is 
that the series is stationary.
The KPSS test complements tests for non-stationarity like the ADF test. The test 
is a Lagrange Multiplier test of the hypothesis that a random walk has zero 
variance. The KPSS is a more powerful test for stationarity and therefore will be 
used to confirm the results obtained from the ADF test. The null hypothesis tested 
is H0: a 1 2 = 0, the series is stationary against the alternative hypothesis HA : a 2 > 
0, series non stationary. The KPSS is estimated as follow (Hill et al, 2012):
KPSS = 1 Y t = i ^ t
t 2
(4.3)
1
Where T is the sample size, =  —var(St) is a HAC estimator of the 
variance of e and St = Yjs=1 is a partial sum process.
For variables that do differ cross sectionally, a panel unit root test which has more 
power than a univariate unit root test is conducted. The variables tested are the 
credit ratings, credit default swap spreads, inflation and stock returns. For this test
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we use the Phillips-Perron test and the Im-Peseran-Shin test. Therefore we 
estimate the Im-Peseran-Shin test as follows (Hill et al, 2012):
Yit = Pi Yi,t- j  + £ ; = 1  <Pij Ay i ,t- j  + z 'it y + % (4.4)
The null hypothesis states that each series in the panel has unit root (i.e. H0: pt = 
1) and the alternative is that at least one of the individual series in the panel is 
stationary (i.e. H0: pt < 1). Unlike other unit root tests, Phillips and Perron use 
non-parametric statistical methods to solve for the problem of possible serial 
correction in the error terms. The Phillips and Perron test is used to complement 
the Im-Peseran-Shin test.
4.5 MODEL SPECIFICATION
4.5.1 PANEL REGRESSION
There are plenty of benefits for using panel data. An important benefit is the 
ability of the data to control for individual heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2001).This 
study draws on studies conducted to assess the effect of Federal Reserve 
announcements on emerging market debt instruments (Arora and Cerisola, 2001; 
Yafeh, 2002; Andritzky et al, 2005; Alper, 2006; Ozatayo et al, 2007). Therefore 
in order to test the determinants of emerging market credit default swap spread 
variation the following model is estimated:
CDSit = at + + Y2VIXt + Y3CRit + Y4SRit + Ys INFit + £it (4 5)
Where i= denotes the BRICS member country and t is the period (2003-2015). 
The first explanatory variable is the federal funds rate. The second variable 
depicts the volatility index, the third explanatory variable shows the credit ratings, 
the fourth variable depicts stock returns and lastly the fifth variable represents 
inflation.
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4.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter outlined the methodology that will be used to obtain the objectives 
outlined in Chapter One. The chapter explained the variables used and the reasons 
thereof. Section 4.2 gave an overview of the period of the study, where the data 
was sourced and the type of data that will be used. Section 4.3 discussed the 
variables that will be utilised in the investigation. Section 4.4 elucidated on the 
tests used to determine the order of integration of the variables. Section 4.5 
discussed the model specification. The next chapter will provide details of the 
findings.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Following the methodology and analytical framework discussed in Chapter Four, 
this chapter now explores the empirical findings. Chapter Five presents the 
regression results which include the results for the tests for stationarity and the 
panel regression. The results will assist in determining the significance of the 
impact of investor sentiment, sovereign credit ratings, US monetary policy, 
inflation and stock returns on BRICS country credit default swap spreads. The 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides a descriptive analysis of the 
visualization of the data. Section 5.3 presents the results of the ADF and KPSS 
test and the Im Pesaran Shin panel unit root test. Section 5.4 presents the results of 
the panel regression. Lastly Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 DESCRIPTION OF DATA VISUALS
Before running tests on the data it is important to depict the data visually in order 
to check for any discernible patterns. Figure 5.1a shows credit default swap 
spreads for the four BRICS countries in basis points (bps). As can be seen from 
Figure 5.1a South African credit default swap spreads had been falling from 2003 
until 2007. There is an observed rise in South African credit default swap spreads 
during 2007 as the crisis took form. During the periods 2008-2009 there is an 
observed peak in spreads, thus spreads widened at the height of the financial 
crisis. Towards 2010 a moderate decline in spreads can be seen and occasional 
bouts of volatility throughout the years till 2015. However, it is notable that 
spreads appear to remain anchored at a higher level after 2008. A similar pattern is 
observed for China and Russia, except that the peak in the Russian case is 
exaggerated. Russia’s credit default swap spreads also depict a much sharper rise 
in spreads during 2014 as Russia received credit downgrades.
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In the case of Brazilian credit default spreads, one can see a marked decline from 
lofty levels prior the 2008 crisis this is a result of improved ratings. Despite credit 
default swap spreads widening over the period of 2008/9, Brazil was granted 
investment grade status by S&P and Fitch in 2008 and by Moody’s 2009. Thus 
the observation of improved credit default spreads post the financial crisis. China 
was the earliest of the BRICS to be granted investment grade status and its ratings 
have been improving gradually. With that being said there was a widening in the 
default premium at the time of the crisis as can be seen in Fig 5.1a.
Figure 5.1c depicts the performance of the BRICS countries’ main indices. In all 
the BRICS nations, one observes a bullish period of rising markets from 2003, 
peaking in 2008 where markets crashed indiscriminately. All bourses recover 
from the lows of 2008 post the crisis, with the Chinese market and South African 
market continuing to rise thereafter. Both the Brazilian and Russian market 
recover for a short period of time before entering a downward trend. This trend 
could be predicated on the sovereign downgrades on the countries post 2011.
Figure 5.1d depicts the historical trajectory of inflation of the BRICS member 
countries. As can be seen from the figure, South African inflation declined from 
the peaks of 1999 (not included in the sample period) when South Africa 
announced its intent to move towards an inflation targeting regime. Inflation 
targeting was formally introduced in the year 2000. Post 2003, inflation in South 
Africa rose and peaked at the height of the global financial crisis. A possible 
explanation is that inflation may have been led by cost-push factors. This is to say 
market participants withdrew portfolio investments from South Africa, leading to 
a depreciation in the South African currency that resulted in higher inflation. Post 
the crisis from 2010 onwards, South African inflation came within the range of 
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) of 3% - 6%.
The pattern of inflation in China bears a similar resemblance however it starts 
from a low base. Inflation in China peaks during the crisis and deflates 
significantly before peaking again in the periods 2010/12. It then appears to 
normalize from 2013 onwards. In Brazil inflation moderated from 2003 until 2007 
where one can observe an uptick in the trajectory. Inflation appears to have been 
ticking higher post 2013. Attributable factors have been discussed above
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concerning sovereign ratings. The implication of deteriorating ratings could have 
prompted investors to withdraw invested funds, affecting the currency and driving 
inflation higher from a supply side channel. The deterioration in credit ratings 
would have been led by, among other things, lowered economic growth prospects 
and political instability that resulted in an impeachment of the then president 
Dilma Rouseff in late 2016.
In Russia, the inflation trajectory appears to follow a downward trend. In 2008/9 
there is an observed spike in inflation. The trend continues downward until it 
troughs in 2012 where inflation begins to rise. Similar to Brazil, sovereign ratings 
may have been an influence in the inflation trajectory along with geopolitical 
events concerning the state of Russia that resulted in developed nations imposing 
sanctions on the country.
Figure 5.1e gives a visual observation of the volatility index. Risk aversion 
appears to decline in the years 2003 until 2007. However, as the global financial 
crisis ensues a spike in implied volatility as measured by the volatility index can 
be seen. A downward trend in risk aversion post 2010 with another spike in the 
periods 2011/12 is observed. Volatility then picks up again in 2015. The 
behaviour observed from the VIX closely resembles what transpires on the default 
spreads for the member countries.
As for the US Fed funds rate Figure 5.1f shows an increase in the rate between the 
periods 2004-2007. There is a precipitous fall in the US interest rates from 2007 
onwards highlighting the change in monetary policy stance to being 
accommodative as a result of the crisis. Since 2009 onwards rates have remained 
near the zero level at 0.25 percent.
For most of the third and fourth quarter of 2015 markets were on edge awaiting 
the Fed to raise interest rates. In December of 2015 the FOMC decided on a 25 
bps increase and again in December 2016. This highlights the Feds decision to 
start a trajectory of interest rate normalisation and an upward interest rate cycle 
going forward.
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5.3 TESTS FOR STATIONARITY
As discussed in the previous chapter testing the order of integration of the 
variables is important so as not to produce results that are misleading. In this 
study the ADF test and the KPSS test were used to test the order of integration 
among variables that do not differ cross sectionally, namely the volatility index 
and the US Federal funds rate.
For the VIX, tests were conducted with an intercept in level terms and first 
difference. Section A of the appendix provides the results obtained. Results from 
the ADF test show that the VIX data is stationary in level terms. Therefore it is 
integrated in level terms (I(0)). The ADF test was also used to test the US Fed 
funds target rate data with an intercept. The US Fed funds rate was found to be 
integrated of the first order (I(1)).
The Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test was then used to verify the 
order of integration. The results are shown in Section A of the appendix. Both the 
volatility index and US Fed funds target rate were found to be stationary in level 
terms and are therefore integrated in level terms (I(0)). For the variables that 
differed across sections the Im-Peseran-Shin test and Phillip Perron test was used. 
The variables tested were the country sovereign ratings, credit default swap 
spreads, inflation and stock returns. Results are shown in Section B. The variables 
were tested with an intercept. Country credit ratings proved stationary once 
having been differenced using the Im Peseran-Shin test, meaning sovereign 
ratings are integrated of the first order (I(1)). However sovereign ratings were 
stationary in level terms as per the Phillips Perron test. Credit default swap 
spreads were stationary in level terms with both tests. Stock returns were 
integrated of the first order (I(1)). The inflation variable proved to stationary in 
level terms according to the Im Peseran-Shin test and Phillips Perron.
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5.4 REGRESSION RESULTS
5.4.1 PANEL REGRESSION
Table 5.1: Panel regression results: fixed effects model
D ependent V ariable: CD S spreads
M odel 1 M odel 2
Exp lanatory
variab le
Constant 109.5019* -92.61144*
VIX 4.698384* 12.56768*
US FED rate -31.91063* 10.63636*
Co untry
rating
-132.2527* -269.1393*
Stock
Returns
-0.010079* -0.020260*
Inflation 14.39096* 4.465613***
Crisis
d um m y
216.8716*
Crisis
dum m y*
Co untry
Rating
119.6582*
Crisis
dum m y*U S 
FED rate
-47.33144*
Crisis
dum m y* VIX
-8.594725*
Crisis
d um m y*stoc 
k returns
0.011997*
Crisis
dum m y*infla
tion
9.870212*
O bservations 604 604
Adjusted  R2 0.739805 0.780030
F-Statistic 215.3112* 153.7343*
D-W 0.214774 0.283635
SIC 11.86833 11.75386
* significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level. ***significant at 10% level
To determine whether the abovementioned variables have a significant effect on 
BRICS country credit default swap spreads, a balanced fixed effects panel 
regression model was forecasted. The fixed effects model allows for heterogeneity 
or individuality among the countries by allowing each country to have its own
46
intercept. The use of the term fixed effect is due to the fact that intercepts may 
differ across countries but may not differ over time.
Table 5.1 gives the regression results for model one as follows. The coefficient of 
the volatility index is significant at the one percent level and is positive. Therefore 
a point increase in the volatility index will result in an approximate 5 basis point 
increase in default spreads ceteris paribus. Thus the default spreads widen as 
there is a rise in volatility indicating an increase in risk aversion.
The US Fed funds rate is also significant at the one percent level, however the 
coefficient is negative depicting a one percentage point rise in the Fed funds target 
rate to result in an approximate 32 basis point decline in default spreads ceteris 
paribus. The result is interesting and seems to suggest that a tightening of 
liquidity reduces default spreads for emerging markets. One would expect a 
positive relationship between default spreads and US interest rates, whereby a rise 
in US interest rates pushes up emerging market credit default swap spreads as a 
result of ballooning risk premia associated with a rise in foreign denominated debt 
repayments. This would be as a result of the repatriation of portfolio flows to safe 
haven markets like the US. The result appears counter-intuitive and will be 
discussed further when looking at model two.
Looking at the coefficient for country ratings, it is negative and significantly 
affects credit default swap spreads. Thus a one notch upgrade will result in a 132 
basis point decline in credit default swap spreads. This result is similar to studies 
that tested the impact of a rise in sovereign ratings to sovereign bond yield 
spreads. This suggests that idiosyncratic factors, as represented by sovereign 
ratings, have a great impact on BRICS country’s credit default premium.
Stock returns appear to behave in accordance to a priori expectations where a 
rally in stocks would result in a decline in credit default swap spreads. Results 
point to an inverse relationship between stock returns and credit default premia. 
Upon observation, it would appear that the higher the index the more significantly 
lower the credit default premia ceteris paribus.
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Lastly the inflation variable appears to be significant at the one percent. Keeping 
all other variables constant a percentage point rise in inflation increases credit 
default swap spreads by 14 basis points.
To make sure the regression is not spurious we observe the F-statistic which 
shows the overall goodness of fit of the model. The F-stat is significant at the one 
percent level. Therefore we may conclude the model is fitted well.
The regression is run again with the addition of a crisis dummy variable (Model 
2). The crisis dummy is used to determine whether the global financial crisis 
increased spreads, and affected the relationship between the independent variables 
and credit default spreads. Firstly, the dummy is significant at the one percent 
level and suggests that defaults spreads rose by 216 basis points as a result of the 
global financial crisis. This is consistent with the evidence presented in Figure 
5.1, which suggests a marked increase in CDS spreads at the height of the crisis 
for all BRICS countries.
Secondly, the results of the interactive dummies suggest that the relationship 
between spreads and the dependent variables may have been changed by the 
crisis.
Model 2 results are as follows; keeping all the other variables constant, a point 
increase in the volatility index in the period before the financial crisis resulted in 
an approximate 13 basis point rise in default spreads. Thus risk sentiment had an 
effect on credit default swap spreads. The effect after the crisis appears to have a 
lower impact; keeping all other variables constant a point increase in the VIX 
resulted in an approximate 4 basis point rise in credit default spreads. The result 
suggests that the crisis period induced the lowering of risk aversion, resulting in 
lower risk premiums sought by investors from riskier assets. An explanation may 
come in the form of extremely accommodative monetary policy in developed 
markets (both lower interest rates and high liquidity) which sought yields in 
developing markets.
Looking at the US interest rate variable prior the crisis, the variable is positive and 
significant at the one percent level. Therefore a percentage point rise in US 
interest rates increases emerging market CDS spreads by approximately 11 bps.
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This result points to a priori expectations of a linear relationship between the 
tightening of liquidity and emerging market risk premium. Looking at the 
interactive US interest rate dummy, it is significant at the one percent level. 
Therefore post the crisis, keeping all other variables constant, a one percentage 
point increase in US interest rates resulted in a 37 basis point decline in default 
spreads. The outcome purports an inverse relationship. We therefore surmise that 
the result highlights the nature of the US interest rate variable. Despite there being 
an expectation of a linear relationship between US interest rates and emerging 
market credit default spreads, the interest rate variable is a policy instrument. By 
its design, it is an instrument used to ‘lean against the wind’ in times of 
macroeconomic instability. The effects of this variable would also explain the 
behaviour of market participants after the events of the crisis, where global risk 
sentiment appears to have a more muted effect on emerging market credit default 
spreads. Lower interest rates and stimulus in the form of quantitative easing may 
have altered the behaviour of market participants who may have become risk 
loving in order to recoup losses made at the height of the crisis.
Idiosyncratic factors as depicted by sovereign ratings show a marked difference in 
impact after having controlled for the crisis. Whereas prior to the crisis a notch 
increase in sovereign ratings would result in a decline in default spreads of 269 
basis points. After controlling for the financial crisis a notch rise in sovereign 
ratings would decrease default spreads by 149 basis points. This would seem to 
show that improvements in country specific factors were compensated less by the 
markets after the crisis or perhaps already priced in. This would allude to an initial 
decline in the risk behaviour of market actors who were willing to invest at a 
whim.
Looking at the inflation variable, prior to the crisis a percentage point increase in 
inflation would result in a 4.5 basis increase in CDS spreads keeping all other 
variables constant. However, post the crisis a percentage point increase in 
inflation resulted in a 14.33 basis point increase in CDS spreads. Model 2 
suggests that the crisis lead to an exaggeration of the impact of inflation on CDS 
spreads.
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Lastly, the effect of stock returns on credit default premia after controlling for the 
crisis continues to show an inverse relationship between rising equity markets and 
credit default premia within the BRICS. However, the magnitude of the decline in 
credit default premia reduces for each member country as a result of the crisis.
5.5 CONCLUSION
The chapter presented evidence on the investigation that investor sentiment, 
proxied by the VIX, sovereign ratings, stock returns, inflation and US monetary 
policy affected BRICS countries credit default swap spreads. The results suggest 
the impact differed once having controlled for the financial crisis.
The chapter initially presented a descriptive analysis of the data before any tests 
were run. The descriptive analysis of the data visuals allows us to discern patterns 
within the data by using visual observation. The chapter then presented results on 
the integration of the variables that would be used in the regression results. The 
ADF test shows that the volatility index and US federal funds rate are stationary 
in level terms and first difference respectively. While the KPSS tests for 
stationarity showed that the volatility index and US federal funds rate are 
stationary in level terms respectively. Using a panel unit root test, namely the Im 
Peseran Shin test, credit default swap spreads and inflation were stationary in 
level terms, while both stock returns and credit ratings were stationary in first 
differences respectively.
The regression results obtained provided interesting outcomes. The global 
financial crisis appears to have pushed up spreads. This is in line with a priori 
expectations. This is suggestive of the fact that there was negative sentiment 
towards emerging market countries during the period of the crisis. The events of 
the crisis appear to have also weakened the relationship of the independent 
variables with the dependent variable. This impact can be seen in the weakened 
effect of country specific factors on credit default swap spreads. The US interest 
rate seems to have a negative effect, driven by how the policy instrument is used 
to defend against economic instability. Thus this phenomenon can only be 
explained by the following rationale, with the crisis ensuing and negative 
sentiment permeating among emerging markets, interest rates were used by 
developing countries to defend their economies. Also there was use of
50
unconventional monetary policy such as the injection of stimulus into financial 
institutions and the capital markets to preserve financial system stability. This 
scenario created opportunities to engage in ‘carry trading’. This affected global 
investor sentiment as the hunt for yield in risky assets grew on the back of 
perceived risk to reward ratios. Therefore the crisis points to a significant turning 
point in the markets and the behaviour of market participants in terms of risk and 
how it was perceived.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
6.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study had set out to investigate the determinants of BRICS countries credit 
default swap spreads. The study was motivated by the need to supplement existing 
literature that had sought to determine factors affecting emerging market 
sovereign bond yields. The price of sovereign bonds is usually viewed by the 
market as a gauge of a country’s risk. Therefore the larger the risk premium 
required by investors above the risk free rate (US treasuries), the more negative 
the outlook for that particular country, as deemed by the capital markets. 
Following from the abovementioned literature, we sought to determine which 
variables from a selected number of factors significantly affected emerging 
countries credit risk profile.
In Chapter Two of the study, theories that were the foundation of the NFA were 
discussed. These theories were used to describe markets, their participants and the 
assumption of market efficiency. The chapter looked at credit rating agencies as a 
mechanism of creating market stability. The discussion provided views from 
theoretical and empirical literature. The observation made from the literature that 
was analysed is that rating agencies are not leading indicators of the probability of 
default by a sovereign state. In fact credit ratings follow market sentiment when 
market expectations differ highly with the ratings given. Furthermore, credit 
ratings have been shown to increase procyclicality in the business cycle of 
emerging countries.
Since the credit ratings issued by rating agencies are still used by market 
participants to gauge country risk, ratings for the BRICS countries were used in 
determining their relationship with BRICS countries credit default swap spreads. 
Chapter Five provided the results for this analysis. CDS spreads were determined 
to have an inverse relationship with sovereign ratings congruent with other studies 
looking at bond yield spreads and sovereign ratings. Sovereign ratings were also 
seen to have the most significant impact on the variation of the BRICS default
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premium. Before controlling for the global financial crisis, country specific 
factors as encapsulated in the sovereign ratings decreased credit default spreads by 
269 basis points. When controlling for the crisis the impact of a notch upgrade in 
the sovereign ratings decreased credit default swap spreads by 149 basis points. 
Therefore, this points to risk sentiment rewarding emerging markets less for 
improved macroeconomic fundamentals during the crisis period
In assessing market participants and their behaviour, Chapter Two then discussed 
the views given as per classical economic foundations. The chapter discussed the 
rational expectations theory. This theory asserts that market participants make 
decisions using all available information. It is this behaviour of economic agents 
that allows markets to be efficient and self-equilibrate. There were many 
dissenting scholars that provided criticism of the assertions of classical economics 
and therefore rational expectation theory.
Closely linked to classical economics and rational expectations is the efficient 
market hypothesis. The efficient market hypothesis is based on informational 
efficiency and therefore asserts that economic actors form expectations rationally 
and markets aggregate information. This results in asset prices in markets 
containing all aspects of available information.
EMH proved to be less reliable in maintaining the hypotheses proposed by the 
theory on its different forms when having to explain market behaviour in reality. 
Hence the advent of the adaptive markets hypothesis. The adaptive markets 
hypothesis considers varying states of market efficiency unlike the EMH. The 
AMH considers the changes in risk premia over time as a result of the changes in 
the market environment and demographic of market participants. The AMH also 
considers that in active and liquid markets, opportunities for arbitrage will 
continuously exist and lastly that investment strategies will be as a result of 
financial market conditions.
Chapter Three provided a discussion on market participant’s behaviour from the 
perspective of behavioural finance. In contrast to traditional finance theories on 
economic agent behaviour, behavioural finance asserts that market participants are 
limited by their cognition which is their way of thinking, associated emotions and 
the environment the economic agent is exposed to. This relates to the pressures an
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economic agent is subjected to. As a result of these limitations behavioural finance 
explains how the decision making process is vulnerable to biases. The chapter 
established behavioural finance to be premised on two foundations, namely, 
practical limits to arbitrage and investor sentiment. The chapter then elucidated on 
the alternative framework behavioural finance provides to expected utility theory. 
The alternative proposal by behavioural finance for decisions under uncertainty 
was established to be known as prospect theory.
Lastly the chapter discussed the global savings glut hypothesis as proposed by the 
former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, Ben Bernanke. Bernanke presided 
over the Fed during the height of the crisis and instituted highly accommodative 
monetary policy along with financial stimulus. This policy was later known as 
quantitative easing. Quantitative easing created a global liquidity glut that affected 
capital markets. The excess liquidity and low returns associated with developed 
countries created imbalances in portfolio flows towards high yielding emerging 
market assets. Therefore the abundance of liquidity increased the risk appetite of 
global institutional investors who were looking for profitable gains in emerging 
markets. To test the hypothesis presented by the literature in Chapter Three the 
study used the volatility index as a proxy for investor sentiment and US interest 
rates as a proxy for global liquidity and international monetary policy. Regression 
forecasts were made controlling for the crisis and without controlling for the 
financial crisis.
From the results it would appear that the US interest rate had an inverse 
relationship with emerging market credit default swap spreads. However, 
controlling for the crisis there appears to be a clear distinction in the impact where 
prior to the crisis a rise in US interest rates increased emerging market default 
premiums. Post the crisis, one observes the negative relationship once again. This 
was explained in Chapter Five to be as a result of the interest rate being a policy 
instrument that is used as a defence mechanism in deteriorating economic 
conditions.
The results, when testing the impact of investor sentiment on emerging market 
credit default swap spreads showed that increases in volatility do create greater 
risk premium demands. However, when controlling for the crisis, risk premia
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demanded seemed to have weakened. The explanation given in Chapter Five was 
that of increased liquidity affecting the risk perception of market actors. Policies 
like quantitative easing and the lowering of interest rates induced risk appetite for 
global investors who could borrow at historically low interest rates and obtain 
yields from riskier emerging market assets. Furthermore the stimulus provided by 
developed country monetary authorities led to increased speculative trade as 
investors tried to recoup losses incurred during the crisis. The results show that 
the GFC affected the relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable. The results help in explaining the changes seen in perceived 
risk and the actions undertaken by market actors thereof.
BRICS countries stock returns were found to have an inverse relationship with 
credit default premia. It was observed that the higher the index the greater the 
impact on CDS spreads. Controlling for the crisis proved to weaken the impact of 
stock returns on CDS spreads in the period of the crisis. On the contrary, the 
inflation variable showed a marked difference in impact when controlling for the 
crisis. The impact of the inflation variable increases CDS spreads by 4.5 basis 
points for every percentage point rise in inflation ceterist paribus prior to the 
crisis. From the crisis period the effect of inflation on credit default premia 
increases to 14.33 bps for every percentage point increase in inflation keeping all 
other variables constant.
Chapter Four provided the methodology that would be used to obtain results in 
this investigation. A number of emerging market foreign denominated debt 
issuances are included in world indices and therefore many global financial 
institutions hold EM debt instruments. Hence investigating the determinants of 
emerging market risk premia was appropriate. Chapter Four discussed the tests 
that were to be used to determine the order of integration of the variables in the 
model and the model that would be employed to obtain results.
6.2 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Perceived risk by market participants is an important factor in the pricing of 
securities. Market volatility does not remain static for extended periods. An area 
of research that may improve future studies would include a change in the 
frequency of the data from monthly data to the use of daily data. This would
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capture more accurately the effects of volatility in markets on the prices of 
financial assets. Furthermore a study that can include Indian CDS spreads, should 
a longer dated time series be available, would provide fairer comment on the 
determinants of the BRICS countries default premia.
It would also be of interest to have a study that uses another indicator for investor 
sentiment such as the put/call ratio. Rhoad (2012) describes the put call ratio as a 
measure of the number of put options traded vs the number of calls traded. The 
ratio is typically used to gauge the demand for bearish protection against a 
downturn in equities (Rhoad, 2012: 01). Thus the ratio can be used as a barometer 
for sentiment and risk appetite. On days the ratio is higher than 1.0, it would 
indicate that investors are buying more put options in order to cover their long 
positions in a perceived weak environment within markets. When the ratio is 
below 1.0 it would mean market participants are buying more call options in 
anticipation of stronger stock prices (Rhoad, 2012: 01).
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Visualization of Data
Figure 5.1a
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APPENDIX
SECTION A: STATIONARITY TESTS
2003M01 - 2015M07
Variable Test Level of Integration T-statistic Prob
VIX ADF Levelterms -3.409734** 0.0121
US FED 
RATE
ADF Levelterms -1.578127 0.4912
ADF 1stDifference -3.237117** 0.0198
LM statistic
VIX** KPSS Levelterms 0.204627**
US FED 
RATE* KPSS
Level
terms 0.644229**
ADF: H 0: Variable has unit root /  critical values: -2.58; -1.943; -1.615 (Significance levels: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*)
KPSS: H 0: Variable is stationary /  critical values 0.7390; 0.4630; 0.3470* (Significance Levels: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*)
KPSS: H 0: Variable is stationary/critical values 0.216000; 0.146000; 0.119000** (Significance Levels: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*)
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SECTION B: PANEL UNIT ROOT TESTS
2003M01 - 2015M0
Variable Test Level of Integration W-Statistic Prob
CDS spreads IPS LevelTerms -3.96074 0.0000***
CDS spreads PP LevelTerms 66.3433 0.0000****
Country ratings IPS
p
Difference -6.14173 0.0000***
Country ratings PP Levelterms 26.7329 0.0008***
Stock Returns IPS
p
Difference -7.70697 0.0000***
Stock Returns PP
p
Difference 317.513 0.0000***
Inflation IPS LevelTerms 4.88394 0.0000***
Inflation PP LevelTerms 19.3792 0.0130**
Im Pesaran and Shin; H0: Individual unit root process (unit root) 1%***, 5%**, 10%*
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